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INTRODUCTION

The renewable energy revolution is coming. The electric utility
industry is facing disruptive challenges that are expected to change
1
the industry as a whole. One of the foremost disruptive challenges
2
to the industry is distributed generation (DG). DG refers to
electric power generated on the customer side of the meter, usually
3
“located on-site or near its customer base,” “such as rooftop solar
4
panels or wind turbines.”
5
In recent years the price of DG has steadily declined. As the
price of DG falls, the availability of the technology rises, allowing
6
more people to turn to DG to produce their own energy. DG can,
and is, being used to either supplement individual energy use or to
produce enough to cover individual energy consumption in its
7
entirety. At the same time, independent power producers are
constructing renewable energy sources or purchasing energy from
renewable energy sources to meet mandated renewable energy
8
goals. This combination could add up to a future where fossil

1. PETER KIND, EDISON ELEC. INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL
IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 1
(2013).
2. Gina S. Warren, Vanishing Power Lines and Emerging Distributed Generation,
4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 347, 357 (2014) (“For utilities, the most significant
disruptive innovation is increased utilization and availability of distributed energy
resources.”).
3. Id.
4. Allyson Umberger, Comment, Distributed Generation: How Localized Energy
Production Reduces Vulnerability to Outages and Environmental Damage in the Wake of
Climate Change, 6 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 183, 189 (2012).
5. AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, DISTRIBUTED GENERATION: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT
POLICY AND MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 6 (2013).
6. Id. at 5–6; JANET L. SAWIN ET AL., REN21, RENEWABLES 2013 GLOBAL STATUS
REPORT 3 (2013) (“In 2012, prices for renewable energy technologies, primarily
wind and solar, continued to fall, making renewables increasingly mainstream and
competitive with conventional energy sources.”); Warren, supra note 2, at 347
(“These innovative technologies are not only appealing to today’s tech-savvy
customers, they are also becoming more economically accessible to the average
customer.”).
7. Warren, supra note 2, at 359 (commenting that people’s reliance on the
transmission grid will decrease or be completely eliminated after starting to use
DG).
8. Daniel A. Lyons, Federalism and the Rise of Renewable Energy: Preserving State
and Local Voices in the Green Energy Revolution, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1619, 1664
(2014) (“[S]tate public utility commissions have largely driven greater demand for
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fuels and other traditional nonrenewable energy sources
(nonrenewables) will become ancillary to renewable energy sources
(renewables).
The transition will not occur instantly, but the change is
9
10
coming : the perpetual rise of renewables can only mean the
11
inevitable decline of nonrenewables. In a world that has a finite
amount of energy use, renewable and nonrenewable sources
cannot both hold the top spot of the market share; as one rises, the
12
other must fall.
13
The rise of DG and renewables, while inevitable, is
14
happening faster in some places than others. Minnesota has new
15
policies in place to encourage DG and renewables, but there is
renewable energy, primarily through renewable portfolio standards that require
utilities to purchase a certain percentage of their electricity for distribution from
renewable sources.”).
9. See Warren, supra note 2, at 347 (citing Dan Yates, Ending Big Electric Bill
Era, CNBC (July 2, 2013, 11:53 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100842506)
(estimating that distributed energy will contribute as much as “20 percent of U.S.
power supply by 2020”).
10. See Reed Landberg, Renewable Energy Installations to Rise 37% by 2015,
BNEF Says, BLOOMBERG BUS., Apr. 8, 2014, available at http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2014-04-08/renewable-energy-installations-to-rise-37-by-2015-bnef-says.html;
see also Jonathan Fahey, Renewable Energy Growth Is Rising Around the World, IEA Says,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 2013, 1:19 PM), http://www.huffington post.com
/2013/06/26/renewable-energy-growth_n_3504265.html (“Renewable power,
including hydropower, is the fastest-growing power generation sector and it is
expected to increase by 40 percent in the next five years.”).
11. See Fahey, supra note 10 (“Renewable energy is growing fast around the
world and will edge out natural gas as the second biggest source of electricity, after
coal, by 2016 . . . .”).
12. See id.
13. Experts Weigh Impact of Distributed Generation on Utility Business Model,
E&E TV (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/tv/videos/1771/transcript (“Jeff
Navin: It’s not a question as to whether or not there’s going to be distributed
generation. The question is how can regulators and utilities work to come up with
a business model . . . .”); Joe Wiedman et al., An Action Plan for Distributed
Generation, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.renewable
energyworld.com/rea/blog/post/2013/11/an-action-plan-for-distributed
-generation (“The forces of consumer demand and technological innovation make
change inevitable.”).
14. See Renewable Energy in the 50 States, AM. COUNCIL ON RENEWABLE ENERGY,
http://www.acore.org/publications/50states/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (providing reports on the amount of renewable energy production in each state).
15. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 216B.164 (2014) (encouraging cogeneration and
small power production).
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16

still room for improvement. This Note argues that DG and
renewables can and should be implemented more substantially in
Minnesota by amending current statutes and changing the utilities’
traditional business models. Part II gives a brief overview of energy
17
law in Minnesota. Part III discusses the need for change from
nonrenewables to renewables and the emerging technologies that
18
are making that change feasible. Part IV lays out the current
policies in Minnesota that both allow for, and hinder, DG and
19
renewables. It also offers recommendations for improvement in
20
Minnesota’s current policies based on other states’ practices.
Finally, Part V discusses the current utility business model and the
new model that has been proposed to incentivize DG and
21
renewables.
II. ENERGY LAW IN MINNESOTA
Energy law is a conglomeration of several different areas of
law; one of the most prevalent being administrative law directed
22
through regulatory bodies. There are both federal and state
regulatory bodies involved in energy regulation, and more
23
specifically, electricity regulation. The Federal Energy Regulatory
24
Commission “regulates the interstate transmission of electricity.”
Every state has its own regulatory body that promulgates rules
25
based on state statutes. The regulations are used to govern the
26
electric utilities’ intrastate activities.

16. See, e.g., John Farrell, Minnesota’s Value of Solar, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF
-RELIANCE (May 1, 2014), http://www.ilsr.org/minnesotas-value-of-solar/ (describing Minnesota’s “value of solar” program); Net Metering, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN
ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., http://www.aceee.org/topics/net-metering (last visited
May 1, 2015) (discussing best practices for net metering).
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
22. Terence Daintith, A Mirror of Change? The Journal and the Development of
Energy Law, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 469, 470 (2012) (dividing energy law
into two parts, with one part being closely related to administrative law and its
regulation of utilities).
23. See What FERC Does, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, http://www
.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
24. Id.
25. See About NARUC, NAT’L ASS’N REG. UTIL. COMMISSIONERS, http://www
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Public Utilities Commission

Minnesota’s electric utility regulatory body is the Public
27
Utilities Commission (PUC). The mission of the PUC is to “create
and maintain a regulatory environment that ensures safe, reliable,
28
and efficient utility services at fair and reasonable rates.” In
furtherance of this mission, the PUC “emphasizes the production
and consumption of energy resources that will minimize damage to
29
the environment.” The PUC is thus required to take into
consideration the reliability of energy services, the reasonableness
of rates, and environmental factors when making decisions.
A central responsibility of the PUC is to determine what
constitutes a “fair and reasonable rate” for both the utilities and the
30
ratepayers. The PUC is charged with determining a reasonable
rate in order “to tame what economists considered a natural
31
monopoly industry.” A natural monopoly occurs in the electric
utility industry because once “an electric utility erects a
transmission line, there is no good economic reason to lay another,
32
competing . . . transmission line.” There will not “be enough gains
from competition to cover the cost of having two sets of power
33
distribution lines.” Thus, the solution to the natural monopolies
34
was for governments to step in and begin regulating. In this way,
the natural monopoly is allowed to continue, offering nonmonopolistic rates to ratepayers while still providing stable earnings
35
for utility investors.

.naruc.org/about.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
26. Lyons, supra note 8, at 1626.
27. The Minnesota Public Utility Commission, MINN. PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION,
http://mn.gov/puc/ (last visited May 1, 2015).
28. About Us, MINN. PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, http://mn.gov/puc/aboutus
/index.html (last visited May 4, 2015).
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Lyons, supra note 8, at 1626; see also JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D.
CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 169–73 (2d ed. 2011).
32. TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 31, at 171.
33. Tim Worstall, Which Should We Have: Public Utilities or Regulated Private
Monopolies?, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2013, 2:33 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tim
worstall/2013/03/24/which-should-we-have-public-utilities-or-regulated-private
-monopolies/.
34. TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 31, at 171.
35. Id. at 172–73.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 3

1696

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:5

The utility companies annually adjust their rates with the PUC
36
using a complex set of factors to determine the new rate.
However, the formula that is used relies heavily on two specific
factors: “1) the total dollar amount of capital invested in new assets
like power plants and power lines, and 2) the total amount in
kilowatt hours of electricity sold to customers, also referred to as
37
‘ratepayers.’” These two factors make up the majority of what is
38
considered the utilities’ traditional business model. The more
capital investments made, and the more electricity sold, the higher
the operating costs and thus the higher the rate.
Unfortunately, under the traditional business model, DG
39
reduces the revenue generated by the utilities. As more people
turn to DG, the increased number of people using DG reduces the
need for utilities to invest in new power plants and power lines, and
it reduces the amount of electricity being sold to customers.
However, even though less electricity is being sold, the price of
40
transmission remains the same. This increases the cost for those
remaining on the grid, which in turn will motivate those remaining
41
to switch to DG as it becomes cost-effective. Thus, if DG continues

36.
37.

See id. at 182–92.
Policy Framework to Optimize Efficiency of the Electrical Energy System, CITIZENS
LEAGUE 3, http://citizensleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/510.RPT
_.Policy-Framework-to-Optimize-Efficiency-of-the-Electrical-Energy-System.pdf (last
visited May 4, 2015).
38. Id.; see also William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA
L. Rev. 1614, 1617–18 (2014); Stephanie Levine, Increasing Energy Efficiency Through
New Utility Business Models, ECOVA (June 18, 2014), http://www.ecova.com
/ecova/blog/2014/june/increasing-energy-efficiency-through-new-utility-business
-models.aspx.
39. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF DISTRIBUTED
GENERATION AND RATE-RELATED ISSUES THAT MAY IMPEDE THEIR EXPANSION 8-1
(2007), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/exp-study.pdf; Levine, supra
note 38 (“Under utilities’ traditional business models, customer-owned generation
and increased energy efficiency reduce the revenue a utility earns.”).
40. See Levine, supra note 38.
41. KIND, supra note 1, at 17; Emily Holden, On-Site Renewable Growth
Complicates Utility Planning, Experts Say, CQ ROLL CALL, Nov. 8, 2013, available at
2013 WL 5960875 (“Without action, utilities could wind up in a ‘death spiral,’
Shuford said, where they are chasing an ever shrinking customer base to pay for
infrastructure built for a larger customer base. The higher the rates rise, the more
customers leave the system.”).
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to rise as predicted and the utilities wish to avoid this spiral, they
42
will need to change their business model.
B.

Renewable Energy Standard

In 2007, the PUC also took on a new responsibility ascribed
43
to it by a modification to Minnesota Statutes section 216B.1691.
The modification created a “mandatory renewable portfolio
44
standard . . . called the Renewable Energy Standard.” The
mandated goals of the Renewable Energy Standard require specific
percentages of overall retail electricity sales to be entirely from
45
eligible energy technologies by specific dates. Eligible energy
technologies include solar, wind, hydro-electric under 100
46
megawatts, hydrogen, or biomass. The ultimate goal is for the
state’s largest utility, Xcel Energy, to be at 30% eligible energy
technologies by 2020 and for all other utilities to be at 25%
(including municipal owned utilities and cooperative electrical
47
associations) by 2025. In 2013 there was a further modification to
Minnesota Statutes section 216B.1691, specifying that at least 1.5%
of the public “utility’s total retail electric sales to retail customers in
48
Minnesota” need to be from solar generation by the end of 2020,
49
with an overall goal of 10% for the state by the end of 2030.

42.
43.

See KIND, supra note 1, at 17–18; Holden, supra note 41.
See THE MINN. OFFICE OF ENERGY SEC., MINN. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT
TO THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE: PROGRESS ON COMPLIANCE BY ELECTRIC UTILITIES
WITH THE MINNESOTA RENEWABLE ENERGY OBJECTIVE AND THE RENEWABLE ENERGY
STANDARD 2 (Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://cusp.umn.edu/WE_Readings/Lec
%202_1%20Compliance%20with%20Renewable%20Energy%20Objectives.pdf;
Renewable Portfolio Standard, DATABASE ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY,
http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/2401 (last updated Oct.
31, 2014).
44. Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra note 43.
45. See MINN. STAT. § 216B.1691, subdiv. 2(a) (2014).
46. Id. § 216B.1691, subdiv. 1(a).
47. See Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra note 43; see also MINN. STAT.
§ 216B.1691, subdiv. 2(b). “An electric utility that owned a nuclear generating
facility as of January 1, 2007, must meet the requirements of this paragraph rather
than paragraph (a).” Id. The only utility that meets this requirement is Xcel. See
Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra note 43.
48. MINN. STAT. § 216B.1691, subdiv. 2(f).
49. Id. § 216B.1691, subdiv. 2(f)(c); see also Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra
note 43.
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It is the PUC’s responsibility to monitor utility compliance with
50
the Renewable Energy Standards. To monitor compliance, and
the eventual attainment of these goals, the PUC created tradable
51
renewable energy certificates (REC). The utilities use RECs to
quantify the percentage of retail energy sales generated or
52
procured using eligible renewable resources. “A REC is created
for each . . . [megawatt per hour] generated” by an eligible
53
54
renewable resource. Once a REC is created, it must be “retired,”
and the percentage that one megawatt represents is added to a
55
utility’s total percentage of retail sales for the year.
III. THE FEASIBILITY OF RENEWABLES AND
DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
Academics and the public have been aware of the negative
effects that fossil fuels and other nonrenewables have had on our
56
planet for years. However, it has only been in the recent past that
the majority of the population began to truly consider both current
57
and future regulatory actions to combat climate change. In so
doing, more people have begun to look to renewables as a
sustainable power source for themselves and society, turning away
58
from the idea that renewables are just a novelty. This transition is
50. See Renewable Portfolio Standard, supra note 43 (“Utilities are required to
file annual compliance reports with the PUC . . . .”).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See DIV. OF ENERGY RES., MINN. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT TO THE
MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE: PROGRESS ON COMPLIANCE BY ELECTRIC UTILITIES WITH THE
MINNESOTA RENEWABLE ENERGY OBJECTIVE AND THE RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD
7–8 (2013), available at http://mn.gov/commerce/energy/images/2013RESLeg
Report.pdf.
56. Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451, 453 (1993) (discussing the effects of
fossil fuels on climate change and the establishment of the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1990
by the UN); see also Dominique Mosbergen, Americans Are Getting More Worried
About Climate Change, According to New Polls, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 23, 2014,
6:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/23/climate-change-polls_n
_5870534.html.
57. Mosbergen, supra note 56.
58. See Melissa Powers, Small Is (Still) Beautiful: Designing U.S. Energy Policies to
Increase Localized Renewable Energy Generation, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 595, 606 (2012)
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not motivated by a sudden change in the perception of renewables
and effects on the environment as much as the transition has been
motivated by the feasibility of making a change that is equal parts
59
financially sensible and environmentally appealing.
A.

The Environmental Argument for Renewables

There are myriad environmental reasons for transitioning
from nonrenewables to renewables. The negative impacts of
nonrenewable sources are well documented and consist of, but are
not limited to, land degradation through mining, environmental
ruin through global warming, and public health issues caused by
60
air and water pollution. One-third of the U.S. global warming
61
emissions are created through electricity production. Coal-fired
power plants alone account for 25% of the U.S. global warming
62
emissions. Health issues associated with emissions from coal and
natural gas plants include “breathing problems, neurological
63
damage, heart attacks, and cancer.”
“Minnesota is already experiencing impacts from climate
change, and will continue to experience impacts to our ecosystems,
64
natural resources, and infrastructure.” The increased temperature
during the summer will negatively affect public health and the
quality of life due to “increasing heat waves, reduced air quality,
65
and increasing insect-borne and waterborne diseases.” The altered

(“Renewable energy experienced a remarkable decade of growth from 2001–2011.
Renewable energy production actually eclipsed electricity production from
nuclear plants in the first quarter of 2011.”).
59. See Warren, supra note 2, at 347–48.
60. The Hidden Cost of Fossil Fuels, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://
www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/the
-hidden-cost-of-fossil.html (last visited May 1, 2015); see also Uma Outka,
Environmental Justice Issues in Sustainable Development: Environmental Justice in the
Renewable Energy Transition, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 60, 68 (2012).
61. Benefits of Renewable Energy Use, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www
.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/renewable-energy/public-benefits
-of-renewable.html (last visited May 1, 2015).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Climate Change in Minnesota, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY,
http://www.pca.state.mn.us/index.php/topics/climate-change/climate-change-in
-minnesota/greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-minnesota.html (last modified May 8,
2014, 2:02 PM).
65. Id.
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summer growing season will have an effect on Minnesota’s
agricultural sector, including “the potential for increased crop
yields, increases in heat waves, floods, droughts, insects, and
weeds[, which] will present increasing challenges to managing
66
crops, livestock, and forests.”
The positive environmental impacts of renewables are just as
well documented as the negative impacts of nonrenewables.
Renewable energy, while not completely devoid of carbon dioxide
67
emissions, creates far less emissions in comparison to fossil fuels.
If implemented on a large scale, renewable energy can significantly
68
reduce global warming emissions. The reduction of global
warming emissions can, in turn, have a positive impact by
69
mitigating the negative effects of climate change, which for
Minnesota means improved public health and increased climate
70
stability for agriculture. Environmental and health benefits would
also accompany reduced air and water pollution that is directly
71
attributable to fossil fuel production.
Renewable energy has its own environmental issues. Large
72
solar power projects can require sizable amounts of land. Large
wind projects also suffer from the same land requirement issues
and are under siege from conservationists for the effects such
73
projects can have on bird populations and migrations. However,

66. Id.
67. Benefits of Renewable Energy Use, supra note 61 (“Compared with natural
gas, which emits between 0.6 and 2 pounds of carbon dioxide equivalent per
kilowatt-hour (CO2E/kWh), and coal, which emits between 1.4 and 3.6 pounds of
CO2E/kWh, wind emits only 0.02 to 0.04 pounds of CO2E/kWh, solar 0.07 to 0.2,
geothermal 0.1 to 0.2, and hydroelectric between 0.1 and 0.5.”).
68. Id.
69. Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climate
change/reducing-emissions.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2015); see also The Science,
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/campaigns/global-warming
GREENPEACE,
-and-energy/science/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
70. See Climate Change in Minnesota, supra note 64.
71. The Hidden Cost of Fossil Fuels, supra note 60 (discussing the different
pollutants that are produced when fossil fuels are combusted and the negative
consequences for both the environment and human health); see also Benefits of
Renewable Energy Use, supra note 61.
72. Examining the Advantages and Disadvantages of Solar Power, SUSTAINABLE
DEV. INFO. (Mar. 10, 2013), http://www.sustainabledevelopmentinfo.com/solar
-power-advantages-and-disadvantages/.
73. Jess White, Disadvantages of Wind Energy, RENEWABLEENERGYSPOT.COM,
http://www.renewableenergyspot.com/disadvantages-of-wind-energy/ (last visited
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both solar and wind projects have small scale production options
74
available, which does not exist for fossil fuels, and efforts are
being made to alleviate conservationist concerns over the negative
75
effects of large wind projects.
There are several other
76
environmental effects of renewable energy; however, these effects
77
are negligible relative to the effects of fossil fuels. All energy
sources have pros and cons, but it is the energy sources with the
greatest ability to reduce carbon emissions that should be
developed and invested in most heavily.
B.

The Economic Argument for Renewables

Recent technological advances have precipitated a decrease in
78
the cost of renewables. As the technologies become more
advanced, the capital costs to produce those technologies declines,
79
and the efficiency of those same products increases. This means
Feb. 22, 2015); see also Ros Krasny, U.S. Extends Permits to 30 Yrs for Wind Farms that
Accidentally Kill Eagles, REUTERS, Dec. 6, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com
/article/2013/12/07/wind-farms-eagles-idUSL2N0JM00N20131207.
74. Environmental Impacts of Solar Power, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/renewable-energy
/environmental-impacts-solar-power.html#.VLLvqfldUdo (last updated Mar. 5,
2013); Environmental Impacts of Wind Power, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/renewable-energy
/environmental-impacts-wind-power.html#.VLLuzfldUdo (last visited Feb. 22,
2015).
75. Environmental Impacts of Wind Power, supra note 74.
76. Environmental Impacts of Renewable Energy Technologies, UNION CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/renewable
-energy/environmental-impacts-of.html#.VCDpwPldXO8 (last visited Feb. 22,
2015).
77. Id. (“All energy sources have some impact on our environment. Fossil
fuels—coal, oil, and natural gas—do substantially more harm than renewable
energy sources by most measures . . . .”).
78. TRIEU MAI ET AL., RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES STUDY: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY iii (2012), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/52409-ES.pdf
(“[I]mprovement in the cost and performance of renewable technologies is the
most impactful lever for reducing this incremental cost [associated with high
renewable generation].”).
79. Peter Kelly-Detwiler, As Solar Panel Efficiencies Keep Improving, It’s Time to
Adopt Some New Metrics, FORBES (July 16, 2013, 10:24 AM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/peterdetwiler/2013/07/16/as-solar-panel-efficiencies-keep-improving-its
-time-to-adopt-some-new-metrics/; see also ERIC LANTZ, MAUREEN HAND & RYAN
WISER, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., THE PAST AND FUTURE COST OF WIND ENERGY
5 (2012), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/54526.pdf (“Over the
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the average consumer will pay less per unit and will need to
purchase fewer total units to achieve the same amount of energy
generation as a renewable system purchased only a few years
before.
80
The cost of solar has decreased more than 50% since 2008.
Photovoltaic (PV) panels, the technology used for solar panels most
commonly found on rooftops, have fallen in price “from $3.80/watt
81
in 2008 to $0.86/watt in 2012” to between $0.69/watt and
82
$0.73/watt in 2014. The PV panel costs are known as “hard costs,”
83
but there are also “soft costs” associated with solar energy. Soft
costs include financing, installation, interconnection, permitting,
84
legal services, and labor. As solar panel costs fall, the soft costs are
starting to take up a larger percentage of the price tag involved in
85
setting up solar generation. However, soft costs have seen their
past 30 years, the cost of wind energy has significantly decreased, due to both
capital cost reductions and performance improvements. . . . [A]s capital costs have
moderated from their 2009–2010 levels, the cost of wind energy has fallen and is
now at an all-time low . . . .”).
80. Silvio Marcacci, Analysis: 50% Reduction in Cost of Renewable Energy Since
2008, CLEANTECHNICA (Sept. 11, 2013), http://cleantechnica.com/2013/09/11
/analysis-50-reduction-in-cost-of-renewable-energy-since-2008/; Zachary Shahan,
What Is the Current Cost of Solar Panels?, CLEANTECHNICA (Feb. 4, 2014), http://
cleantechnica.com/2014/02/04/current-cost-solar-panels/. The focus is on solar
and wind energy because they are the most abundant of the renewables. See MAI ET
AL., supra note 78, at 9 (“The United States has diverse and abundant renewable
resources, including biomass, geothermal, hydropower, ocean, solar, and wind
resources. Solar and wind are the most abundant of these resources.”).
81. KIND, supra note 1, at 4.
82. Solar Market Insight Report 2014 Q4, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http://
www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-market-insight-report-2014-q4 (last visited
Apr. 12, 2014).
83. Kelly-Detwiler, supra note 79.
84. Id.; Julia Hamm, What Solar Success Looks Like, 151 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 10, 11
(2013); NREL Reports Soft Costs Now Larges Piece of Solar Installation Total Cost, NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.nrel.gov/news/press/2013
/5306.html.
85. Michael T. Burr, Beyond the Meter, 152 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 5, 6 (2014)
(“Additionally, soft costs and balance-of-plant hardware now account for more
than half of the price of solar systems.”); Joshua S. Hill, NREL: Soft Costs Now
Largest Piece of Solar Installation Costs, CLEANTECHNICA (Dec. 12, 2013), http://clean
technica.com/2013/12/12/nrel-soft-costs-now-largest-piece-solar-installation-costs;
Minh Le, Help Solve Solar’s Big Challenge, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY (Dec. 2, 2013, 1:00
PM), http://energy.gov/eere/articles/help-solve-solar-s-big-challenge (“‘[S]oft
costs’ of solar energy system . . . now account for up to 64% of the total price of
installing residential solar energy systems in the United States.”).
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86

own reduction. The cost of installation alone dropped 60% in five
87
years. The reduction in soft costs has come from “financial
88
engineering”
and government policies that offer various
89
incentives to promote renewables and offset the soft costs.
The other factor leading to an overall increase in the cost
effectiveness of renewables is the consistent improvement in the
90
efficiency of the technology. Solar efficiency is gauged by how well
91
the panel converts sunlight into electricity. In 2000, the average
watt of solar had a conversion efficiency of 11%; today, that has
92
been improved 16% to 18%. The difference in percentage may
seem minimal, but the difference between a 5% to 7% increase in
93
efficiency is relatively large. With an estimated annual increase of
0.3% per year, the efficiency of each new generation of solar panels
will continuously improve and make solar energy more cost
94
effective with each passing year —compare this to a typical coal
95
plant, which has been said to have already hit its efficiency peak.
C.

Reliability

A central argument against the transition to renewables and
DG is the inherent intermittency of production that creates a lack
96
of reliability in the grid. This is a valid concern, in part because a
86.
87.

Kelly-Detwiler, supra note 79.
John Farrell, The Future of Solar Economics and Policy, INST. FOR LOCAL SELFRELIANCE (May 30, 2014), http://www.ilsr.org/future-net-metering-distributed
-solar/.
88. Kelly-Detwiler, supra note 79.
89. Le, supra note 85 (“In the most recent round of the Solar Incubator
program, [the Energy Department] announced $10 million to fund outside-of-thebox ideas to lesson solar’s hardware and soft costs.”).
90. See Kelly-Detwiler, supra note 79 (improving the economics of the solar
industry by increasing the efficiency of the solar panels).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (“[A]n additional 2% from 16% to 18%, is a large relative increase,
boosting overall electricity output by about 12.5% relative to the initial baseline.”).
94. Id. (“[T]he average increase in efficiency of conventional panels is likely
to improve by approximately 2% over 7 years, or an average of about 0.3%
annually.”).
95. How Coal Works, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org
/clean_energy/coalvswind/brief_coal.html#.VCNsLfldXO8 (last visited Feb. 22,
2014) (“But the efficiency of typical coal plants has peaked at about 33 percent,
limited mostly by their steam turbines.”).
96. Timothy P. Duane & Kiran H. Griffith, Legal, Technical, and Economic
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complete switch to renewables at the current time would likely
97
create a less reliable grid; however, the lack of reliability will
98
eventually be a losing argument.
The more diverse a utility’s energy portfolio is, the more
99
reliable that system becomes. Therefore, an increase in DG and
incorporating various renewables into the grid would ultimately
100
increase reliability.
However, a portfolio made up of only
renewables is not sufficient for grid-wide reliability because of the
101
current limits to storing generated electricity. Some forms of
renewables, such as hydropower and geothermal, do not have the
102
as the more abundant wind and solar
same storage issues
103
sources because hydropower and geothermal are not intermittent
sources of power and thus are not constrained by their ability to
104
Currently, the capability to store electricity
store electricity.
generated by solar and wind energy is not economically viable
105
enough to support grid-scale capacity.

Challenges in Integrating Renewable Power Generation into the Electricity Grid, 4 SAN
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1, 6–7 (2013) (“The specific characteristics of
variability, intermittency, and uncertainty associated with the generating output of
modern renewable generation technologies present a significant technical
challenge to maintain system reliability.”).
97. See Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (discussing reliability concerns related to the transition to
more intermittent renewables).
98. See MAI ET AL., supra note 78, at 14 (“Renewable energy resources,
accessed with commercially available renewable generation technologies, could
adequately supply 80% of total U.S. electricity generation in 2050 while balancing
supply and demand at the hourly level.”).
99. Duane & Griffith, supra note 96, at 9 (“[I]ntegration of multiple
resources increases system costs but also generally increases reliability by reducing
the system’s vulnerability to the loss of any single generator.”).
100. Powers, supra note 58, at 600 (“If properly deployed, distributed
generation systems could help improve the overall reliability of the power grid and
thus pave the way for increased growth of larger renewable sources.”).
101. See PAUL DENHOLM ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., THE ROLE OF
ENERGY STORAGE WITH RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY GENERATION 46 (2010), available at
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/47187.pdf; Powers, supra note 58, at 598
(“With additional advancement, many experts think it is feasible for renewable
power to fuel the entire electricity grid within a relatively short period of time.”).
102. MAI ET AL., supra note 78, at 12.
103. Id. at 9.
104. DENHOLM ET AL., supra note 101, at 1.
105. Id. at 46 (discussing the issue of sufficiency of electricity storage in that
there are ways to store the electricity created by wind and solar but to do so is not
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The lack of storage capabilities means that there is still a place
106
for nonrenewables. However, not all nonrenewables are created
equal. The use of nuclear power, efficient natural gas, and clean
coal are examples of “clean” energies that can be utilized in the
107
interim.
The use of these technologies is by no means an
equitable substitute for renewables, but they are a better alternative
108
to the use of fossil fuels in their current state. The use of these
“clean” energy generators will be necessary to varying degrees until
new technologies that are economically viable to store electricity
109
produced from renewables are created. In the end, as the energy
storage technology advances, the reliability argument will become
more difficult to sustain.
IV. MINNESOTA INCENTIVES AND REGULATIONS FOR INCREASING
RENEWABLES AND DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
Minnesota currently has policies in place intended to
encourage renewables; however, the policies simultaneously
110
support and impede renewables. The policies create room for
111
112
renewables in the energy industry, aid in their development,
economically viable).
106. See Charles C. Mann, Renewables Aren’t Enough. Clean Coal Is the Future,
WIRED (Mar. 25, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/clean-coal/.
107. MAI ET AL., supra note 78.
108. Allison Kole, Carbon Capture and Storage: How Bad Policy Is By-Passing
Environmental Safeguards, 20 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 101, 109 (2014) (“Using
CCS can potentially give a coal-fired power plant an 80–90% reduction in CO2
emissions but would drastically reduce its efficiency and therefore require more
coal to operate.”); Robert C. Means, The Climate Policy Landscape, 4 WAKE FOREST
J.L. & POL’Y 319, 324 (2014) (discussing the relative efficiency of natural gas—that
it emits 40% less carbon than coal, requires 40% less energy to produce than coal,
but that it’s a fossil fuel and therefore still produces carbon at a higher rate than
wind or solar).
109. See Mann, supra note 106 (“I don’t see how we go forward without [clean
coal].” (statement of Steven Chu)).
110. See MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 3a(a) (2014) (“[A] customer with a
net metered facility having a capacity of 40 kilowatts or greater but less than 1,000
kilowatts that is interconnected to a public utility may elect to be compensated for
the customer’s net input into the utility system in the form of a kilowatt-hour
credit on the customer’s energy bill carried forward and applied to subsequent
energy bills.”).
111. See id. § 216B.1691. This statute lays out the percentage of “total retail
electric sales to retail customers in Minnesota” that must be “generated by eligible
technologies” by specific dates. Id. § 216B.1691, subdiv. 2. “Eligible energy
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113

and necessitate their creation, but at the same time artificially
114
restrict their widespread application. The policies in Minnesota
can be improved to remove these artificial restrictions, increasing
the amount of overall renewable energy while still maintaining
reliability. To begin, Minnesota might adjust the current policies to
better incentivize DG. Minnesota might also look to emulate other
115
states that have more progressive policies in place.
The most significant impediment to renewables is arguably the
116
utilities themselves. Utilities resist the transition to renewables for
117
legitimate economic reasons but in so doing will be the bearers of
118
their own decline. Current utility economic business models do
not allow for a major shift in the dynamics of the energy industry,
technology is defined as “energy technology that generates electricity from”
specific renewable energy sources. Id. § 216B.1691, subdiv. 1(a).
112. See id. § 216C.414 (discussing the “made in Minnesota” performancebased financial incentive for solar products produced and installed in Minnesota).
113. Id. § 216B.1691, subdiv. 2f (“[A]t least 1.5 percent of the utility’s total
retail electric sales to retail customers in Minnesota is generated by solar energy.”).
114. See id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 4b (“A public utility may request the
commission to limit the cumulative generation of net metered facilities under
subdivisions 3 and 3a upon a showing that such generation has reached four
percent of the public utility’s annual retail electricity sales.”); id. § 216B.164,
subdiv. 10 (“[A] public utility may apply for commission approval for an alternative
tariff that compensates customers through a bill credit mechanism for the value to
the utility.” (emphasis added)); id. § 216B.1691, subdiv. 10 (stating that there is a
“value of solar” tariff that can set a higher value for solar produced through
distributed generation than the regular retail price paid for net metering;
however, the utilities have to approve the value of solar).
115. For a detailed map of metering limits for every state, see Net Metering,
U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, http://www.usa.org/solar/solarpolicyguide/?id=17 (last visited
Feb. 22, 2015).
116. See Anthony Allen, Comment, The Legal Impediments to Distributed
Generation, 23 ENERGY L.J. 505, 507 (2002) (discussing “turf protection” by utilities
impeding distributed generation).
117. Stephen Lacey, The Argument for Why Utilities Should Give Up Operation
Control of the Distribution Grid, GREENTECH MEDIA (Aug. 18, 2014), http://
www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/why-utilities-should-give-up-operational
-control-of-the-distribution-grid (“They’re also potentially a drain on revenue as
demand growth is diminishedgiving utilities a reason to fight high penetrations
of distributed resources.”).
118. Experts Weigh Impact of Distributed Generation on Utility Business Model, supra
note 13 (“Rhone Resch: I think there’s a real threat to their business model. If
utilities do not evolve and adapt and start providing more services, the services
that their customers want, then they are at risk for losing a significant amount of
market share.”).
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and they are therefore generally opposed to any major change.
However, despite their unwillingness, changes in the industry are
120
occurring.
A.

Distributed Generation in Minnesota

DG is set to play a major role in the energy industry of the
future. Using DG, individuals and businesses can offset their energy
bill and in some cases become entirely self-sufficient with clean
renewable energy for the same price or less than the cost to
121
purchase energy from a utility. Minnesota Statutes chapter 216B
covers utilities and encompasses almost all the regulations and
122
policies regarding DG in Minnesota. The Minnesota DG policy
123
has been in place, in various forms, since 1981. The overall goal
of the policy is “to give the maximum possible encouragement to
cogeneration and small power production consistent with
124
protection of the ratepayers and the public.” That being said, the
thirty-year-old statute was only recently updated in an attempt to
increase the impact of DG.
In 2013, Minnesota House File 729 was adopted, improving
DG in the state by revising chapter 216B in several different
125
regards. Four major revisions to chapter 216B were intended to
119. Justin Gillis, Sun and Wind Alter Global Landscape, Leaving Utilities Behind,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2014, at A1, available at LEXIS (“[S]ome utilities, fearful of
losing out as the power mix changes, have started attacking rules that encourage
solar panels.”); see also Farrell, supra note 87 (“Utilities fighting now are fighting
for a 20th century model of centralized control and comfortable monopoly
profits.”).
120. Rolf Nordstrom, Minnesota’s e21 Initiative Eyes a Sustainable, Carbon-Neutral
Energy System for the Land of 10,000 Lakes, GREAT PLAINS INST. (July 2, 2014), http://
www.betterenergy.org/e21-RMI-blog (discussing the changes that are occurring in
the industry and the work that is being done to change the current utility business
models).
121. Chris Martin et al., Why the U.S. Power Grid’s Days Are Numbered,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08
-22/homegrown-green-energy-is-making-power-utilities-irrelevant.
122. See MINN. STAT. ch. 216B (2014).
123. Id. § 216B.164; ELIZABETH DORIS ET AL., NET METERING POLICY
DEVELOPMENT IN MINNESOTA: OVERVIEW OF TRENDS IN NATIONWIDE POLICY
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASING THE ELIGIBLE SYSTEM SIZE CAP 3
(2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46670.pdf (“Minnesota
began implementing its original a net metering policy in 1981.”).
124. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164.
125. Act of May 23, 2013, ch. 85, 2013 Minn. Laws 544; see John Farrell,
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significantly increase DG’s effectiveness: (1) increase the size of the
126
DG system eligible for net metering; (2) include a value of solar
127
standard for compensation of Solar PV; (3) create policies to
guide the production of community solar gardens; and (4)
establish the Made in Minnesota Solar Thermal Rebate and Solar
Thermal Production Credit.
1.

Net Metering

Traditionally, the main policy tool for incentivizing DG in
128
Minnesota (and the rest of the United States) has been net
metering. Net metering is a way “to keep track of the amount of
129
electricity that flows to and from a customer.” The net metering
statute then requires the utilities to pay the DG owners for the
130
energy they produce. In practice, the owner of the DG system is
billed only for the energy consumed, which is offset by the energy
131
produced through DG.
The DG owner’s energy is valued at the average “retail
132
electricity rate.” This essentially means that the energy created by
the owner is given the same value as the energy created by the
133
utilities. If excess energy is created, the owner is given a bill credit

Minnesota’s New (Standard Offer) Solar Energy Standard, GRIST (May 28, 2013),
http://grist.org/article/minnesotas-new-standard-offer-solar-energy-standard/.
126. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 3a(a) (“[A] customer with a net metered
facility having a capacity of 40 kilowatts or greater but less than 1,000 kilowatts that
is interconnected to a public utility may elect to be compensated for the
customer’s net input into the utility system in the form of a kilowatt-hour
credit . . . .”).
127. Id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(a) (“[A]n alternative tariff that compensates
customers through a bill credit mechanism for the value to the utility, its
customers, and society for operating distributed solar photovoltaic resources
interconnected to the utility system and operated by customers primarily for
meeting their own energy needs.”).
128. Powers, supra note 58, at 635 (discussing the dominance of net metering
in the United States).
129. Warren, supra note 2, at 372.
130. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 3(a).
131. Bill Ehrlich, Net-Metering vs. Value of Solar Tariff (VOST), MOSAIC (Apr. 14,
2014), https://joinmosaic.com/blog/net-metering-vs-value-solar-tariff-vost/.
132. Powers, supra note 58, at 637.
133. Id. (“The existence of net metering thus allows a homeowner to earn full
retail rates (which are often at least 3 times higher than wholesale rates) for much
of the power she produces from her rooftop solar system.”).
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134

that is applied to the next month’s bill. At the end of the year any
135
excess bill credit is credited at the avoided cost rate, which is
essentially zero, leaving the owner empty handed for the excess
produced. For example, if the owner produced more energy than
he, she, or it used during the year, the excess energy would only be
credited back at a rate that is close to zero, instead of the retail
energy rate.
The former statute set the limit at which a DG system could be
136
net metered at a forty-kilowatt capacity. Thus, if an individual or
business owned a DG system larger than forty-kilowatts, they were
not eligible for net metering. It has been shown that “[c]apacity
limits can greatly restrict the expansion of on-site renewable
generation and restrain the market for new renewable energy
137
systems.” This restriction limited the use of DG for commercial
and industrial customers that needed a system larger than forty138
kilowatt to have an appreciable effect on their energy bill.
Minnesota House File 729 increased the eligible size of a DG system
to 1000 kilowatts and in so doing made DG economically practical
139
for commercial and industrial customers. However, the increase
140
only affects DG owners connected to a “public utility.” The public
utilities are the large, for-profit utility companies in the state, such

134. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 3a (“[A] customer . . . may elect to be
compensated for the customer’s net input into the utility system in the form of a
kilowatt-hour credit on the customer’s energy bill carried forward and applied to
subsequent energy bills.”).
135. Id. (“Any net input supplied by the customer into the utility system that
exceeds energy supplied to the customer by the utility during a calendar year must
be compensated at the applicable rate.”); Net Metering, supra note 115.
136. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164 (2004).
137. DORIS ET AL., supra note 123, at 9.
138. See id. at 21 (“Should the net metering system size cap be increased in
Minnesota, commercial and industrial consumers may be more likely to install
larger systems in order to take advantage of available these [sic] federal credits
and to offset a greater percentage of their electricity load.”).
139. Id.
140. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 3a (2014) (“[A] customer with a net
metered facility having a capacity of 40 kilowatts or greater but less than 1,000
kilowatts that is interconnected to a public utility may elect to be compensated . . . .”
(emphasis added)). See generally Davide Savenije, Why Invester-Owned Utilities Should
Fear Munis and Co-ops, UTILITY DIVE (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.utilitydive.com
/news/why-investor-owned-utilities-should-fear-munis-and-co-ops/114574/ (noting
that public utilities are also referred to as investor-owned utilities (IOU)).
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141

as Xcel Energy and Otter Tail Power Company. The other two
forms of utility in the state, municipal owned utilities (municipals)
and cooperative electrical associations (cooperatives), are exempt
142
from the net metering kilowatt increase.
Exempting municipals and cooperatives reduced the incentive
to net meter for a large percentage of the state’s electricity
143
customers.
Forty-three percent of residential customers in
144
Minnesota belong to a municipal or a cooperative. Thirty-six
percent of commercial customers in the state belong to a municipal
145
or a cooperative. Eighty-two percent of industrial customers in
146
the state belong to a municipal or cooperative. Taken inversely,
only 57% of the residential customers, 64% of the commercial
customers, and 18% of the industrial customers statewide are
incentivized by the increase in the kilowatt limit. As a result, 42% of
the electric customers in Minnesota have little to no incentive to
147
switch to DG. This is contrary to the net metering policy goal of
148
maximizing encouragement for DG. Increasing the limit for

141. See generally MINN. STAT. § 216B.02, subdiv. 4 (“‘Public utility’ means
persons, corporations, or other legal entities . . . operating, maintaining, or
controlling in this state equipment or facilities for furnishing at retail natural,
manufactured, or mixed gas or electric service to or for the public or engaged in
the production and retail sale thereof but does not include (1) a municipality or a
cooperative electric association . . . .”).
142. Compare id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 3(a), with id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 3(b).
143. See Meet Minnesota’s Municipal Utilities, MINN. MUN. UTIL. ASS’N, http://
www.mmua.org/about/utilities.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2015). There are
approximately 2,294,000 residential customers connected to a municipal owned
utility, cooperative, or public utility. Id. Approximately 994,000 of those are
connected to municipal owned utilities or cooperatives. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. There are approximately 266,000 commercial customers connected to
a municipally owned utility, Cooperative, or public utility. Id. Approximately
97,000 of those are connected to municipal owned utilities or cooperatives. Id.
146. Id. There are approximately 8700 industrial customers connected to a
municipal owned utility, cooperative, or public utility. Id. Approximately 7200 of
those are connected to a municipal owned utility or cooperative. Id.
147. Id. Minnesota has approximately 2,568,700 total electric customers.
Approximately 1,098,200 of them are connected to municipal owned utilities or
cooperatives. Id.
148. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 1 (2014) (“This section shall at all times
be construed in accordance with its intent to give the maximum possible
encouragement to cogeneration and small power production consistent with
protection of the ratepayers and the public.”).
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municipals and cooperatives would increase the incentive to switch
149
to DG for all those currently being excluded.
The increase in DG systems allowed to net meter also came
with a caveat: “A public utility may request the [PUC] to limit the
cumulative generation of net metered facilities . . . upon a showing
that such generation has reached 4% of the public utility’s annual
150
retail electricity sales.” This works as a possible aggregate cap on
the amount of DG that will be allowed within the state and, if
151
upheld by the PUC, would further disincentivize DG. The PUC
will consider several different criteria on which to base its
152
decision, but it can only limit additional net metering upon a
determination that “additional net metering obligations would
cause [a] significant rate impact, require significant measures to
153
address reliability, or raise significant technical issues.” In a
recent study conducted by the Lawrence Berkley National
Laboratory, it was found that a 10% penetration rate for netmetered PV solar would equate to roughly a 3% increase for all
154
ratepayers. Using the laboratory’s numbers puts the rate increase
at below 1.5% for ratepayers in Minnesota once a 4% cap is
155
reached. Whether 1.5% qualifies as a “significant rate increase”
would be up to the PUC to determine.

149. DORIS ET AL., supra note 123, at i.
150. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 4b.
151. Chris Clarke, Report: California Should Remove Limits on Net Metered Solar,
KCET (Feb. 25, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://www.kcet.org/news/rewire/utilities
/report-california-should-remove-limits-on-net-metered-solar.html; see also AM.
COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., supra note 16 (“Limits on individual and
aggregate system capacities can prevent system owners from installing the most
efficient or cost-effective systems, and sometimes even prevent them from meeting
on-site load requirements.”).
152. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 4b (“[T]he commission shall consider:
(1) the environmental and other public policy benefits of net metered facilities;
(2) the impact of net metered facilities on electricity rates for customers without
net metered systems; (3) the effects of net metering on the reliability of the
electric system; (4) technical advances or technical concerns; and (5) other
statutory obligations imposed on the commission or on a utility.”).
153. Id.
154. ANDREW SATCHWELL ET AL., ERNESTO ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L
LAB., FINANCIAL IMPACTS OF NET-METERED PV ON UTILITIES AND RATEPAYERS: A
SCOPING STUDY OF TWO PROTOTYPICAL U.S. UTILITIES 60 (2014), available at http://
emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/LBNL%20PV%20Business%20Models%20Report_no
%20report%20number%20%28Sept%2025%20revision%29.pdf.
155. A 3% increase at 10% penetration equals a 1.5% increase at 5%
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Another method being applied in some states is to limit net
156
metering not by kilowatt, but by demand. Colorado and the
District of Columbia have set the limit for net metering at 120% of
demand, and in so doing have created a limit based on the need of
157
the customer. This strategy has the benefit of allowing net
metering of any size based on consumption. It thus does not
arbitrarily exclude those who may need a larger system. Minnesota
could follow the lead of these jurisdictions and base the limit on
the level of demand. This would further the goal of maximizing
encouragement for DG by allowing net metering for all industries.
Net metering also has the distinct benefit in that it creates
RECs that the customer is entitled to and can be purchased by the
158
utility. Thus, increasing limits for capacity allowed to net meter,
while also increasing the limits for the aggregate amount of net
metering and including municipals and cooperatives within the net
metering statutory framework, would lead to the creation of more
RECs for the utilities to purchase and thus add to the utilities’
renewable portfolio standards.
2.

Value of Solar

The most innovative new policy to come out of the revisions to
Minnesota Statutes chapter 216B is also, arguably, the most
controversial. The value of solar tariff allows utilities to set a value
for PV solar energy produced by DG as an alternative to the net
159
metering retail rate. The valuation of solar works in essentially
the same way as net metering; a solar energy producer is charged
for the energy consumed and is credited back for the energy
160
produced from the PV solar. However, there are three main

penetration. Thus, a 4% penetration would be under a 1.5% increase.
156. Net Metering, supra note 115.
157. See id.
158. In re Commission Inquiry into Ownership of Renewable Energy Credits
Used to Meet Minnesota Requirements at 1, 6, E-999/CI-13-720 (Minn. P.U.C. July
22, 2014).
159. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(b) (2014) (“The alternative tariff is in
lieu of the applicable rate under subdivisions 3 and 3a.”).
160. Id. § 216B.164, subdivs. 10(c)(3)–(4) (“[C]harges the customer for all
electricity consumed by the customer at the applicable rate schedule for sales to
that class of customer; credits the customer for all electricity generated by the solar
photovoltaic device at the distributed solar value rate established under this
subdivision . . . .”).
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differences between net metering and the value of solar: (1) the
energy produced from PV solar is credited back at the value of
161
solar rate; (2) the value of the solar rate can be locked in by a
162
twenty-five year contract; and (3) the value of solar produces
163
RECs that transfer directly to the utilities.
The value of solar rate is calculated by the utility and must
include “the value of energy and its delivery, generation capacity,
transmission capacity, transmission and distribution line losses, and
164
environmental value.” The methodology, as well as the final value
165
attributed to solar, are then subject to the approval of the PUC,
but the final decision to implement the value is in the hands of the
utilities themselves. Value of solar is considered innovative because
of the inclusion of externalities in the calculation, such as the
avoided environmental, fuel, and new power plant purchase
166
costs.
The twenty-five year contract has benefits for both the utilities
167
and the solar energy producer. For producers, it helps to secure
168
financing. A producer is more likely to be able to secure a loan
for the PV solar system if there is a guaranteed return on the
investment. With a twenty-five year contracted rate of return for the
energy produced, the investment becomes financially secure and
169
borrowing costs are lowered. There is an additional benefit in the
fact that the current value of solar rate is projected to be greater
170
than the retail rate. So, initially, the producer will pay for energy
at the retail rate and will receive a higher rate for the energy
produced from the PV solar.
161. Id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(c)(5).
162. See id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(k) (“[A] term of at least 20 years . . .”);
JOHN FARRELL, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, MINNESOTA’S VALUE OF SOLAR: CAN A
NORTHERN STATE’S NEW SOLAR POLICY DEFUSE DISTRIBUTED GENERATION BATTLES?,
iii (2014), available at http://www.ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MN
-Value-of-Solar-from-ILSR.pdf (discussing the value of the 25-year contract).
163. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(i).
164. Id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(f).
165. Id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(e).
166. See John Farrell, Could Minnesota’s “Value of Solar” Make Everyone a Winner?,
INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.ilsr.org/minnesotas
-value-solar-winner/ (discussing the adoption of externalities in the value of solar
calculation).
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. FARRELL, supra note 162, at 6.
170. Id.
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The benefit to the utilities from the contract comes with time.
The retail rate for energy has historically risen every year, recently
171
measured at an increase of 4%–5% per year. The value of solar
172
rate, on the other hand, is locked in for twenty-five years. Over
time, the utilities will be paying less for the value of solar than they
173
will for the retail rate.
This scenario, while a benefit for the utilities, has split the
support for the value of solar. Under the statute, the value of solar
174
is to be recalculated and approved every year. It has been
projected that because of the annual recalculation, the value of
175
solar will actually introduce more uncertainty, not less. The
uncertainty created by the annual recalculation is predicted to
176
dissuade any long-term investors from entering the market. The
statute also requires that the value of solar remain above the retail
177
rate for the first three years. Due to this, it is predicted that there
will be a significant boom and bust if the utilities choose to
178
implement the value of solar. For the first three years, while the
value of solar is required to be higher than the retail rate, the
179
industry will see rapid growth. After the three-year period, the
utilities will recalculate a value of solar rate that is less than the
retail rate, and the financial incentive will disappear, along with the
180
investors.
During the legislative process, several compromises were made
181
to get the value of solar legislation passed.
One of the
compromises was to give the RECs created using the value of solar

171. Id. at 14.
172. Id. at i.
173. Id. at 15.
174. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(h) (2014).
175. Frank Jossi, Minnesota Regulators Side with Utility in Value-of-Solar Case,
MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2014
/08/07/minnesota-regulators-side-with-utility-in-value-of-solar-case/.
176. Yann Brandt, Does VOST=FiT, What Is a Value of Solar Tariff (VOST)?,
SOLARWAKEUP, http://www.solarwakeup.com/2014/02/25/does-vostfit-what-is-a
-value-of-solar-tariff-vost/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2015); see also Jossi, supra note 175.
177. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(j).
178. Anne Smart, Value of Solar Tariffs (VOSTs) Are Value of Solar Taxes,
HUFFINGTON POST (MAR. 28, 2015, 5:14 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/anne-smart/value-of-solar-power-tariffs-_b_5051448.html.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. FARRELL, supra note 162, at i–ii.
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182

directly to the utilities. RECs created through the value of solar
directly benefit utilities by making more RECs available to reach
their renewable energy standards at no additional costs to the
utility.
Another compromise to get the value of solar passed was the
amendment to continue to allow the utilities to make the final
183
determination of whether to implement the value of solar. This
compromise created yet more controversy. Giving the utilities the
decision to use the value of solar completely removes the power
184
from the consumer. The statutory language provides that the
185
value of solar is “in lieu of” the retail rate for net metering. Thus,
if a utility decides to use the value of solar, the option to net meter
will no longer be available to consumers. Removing the option to
net meter has removed a benefit of DG, the democratization of the
186
energy grid. When people produce their own power, it reduces
their dependence on utilities and, in return, gives them greater
political and economic power to challenge the utilities’
187
monopoly. This power is lost when utilities are allowed to make
188
decisions for the consumer.
The most current controversy is the possibility of being taxed
189
on income generated through the value of solar tariff. The
purchase of power produced from solar generators by utilities has
created the following question: does this qualify as income, and can
190
it therefore be taxed? The IRS is in the process of formally
reviewing the value of solar tariffs to determine the answer to this
191
question. It is because of these controversies that many solar

182. Id. at 16; see also MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(i).
183. FARRELL, supra note 162, at 14.
184. Andy Colthorpe, TASC: Minnesota Value of Solar Tariff Will ‘Entrench
Monopoly’ of Utilities, PV-TECH (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.pv-tech.org/news/tasc
_minnesota_value_of_solar_tariff_will_entrench_monopoly_of_utilities.
185. MINN. STAT. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(b).
186. See John Farrell, Solar and the New (Democratic) Energy Economy, INST. FOR
LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.ilsr.org/solar-new-energy
-economy/.
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. See Edgar Meza, IRS to Review Value of Solar Tariffs in Austin, Texas, PV
MAG. (Sept. 25, 2014), http://m.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/irs-to
-review-value-of-solar-tariffs-in-austin--texas_100016561/.
190. See id.
191. Id.
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192

advocate groups are against the value of solar tariffs. It is their
opinion that net metering was working just fine for growing the
193
solar market, so why fix what was not broken?
The success or failure of the value of the solar tariff in
Minnesota may help other states to determine whether the value of
solar should be adopted in their state and, if adopted, what
characteristics the value of solar should have. In Minnesota, the
compromises made to get the value of solar bill enacted changed
the bill from its original form and, in the process, reduced some of
194
the benefits to the consumer. However, the purpose behind the
value of solar, determining a market-based price around
195
environmental value, still exists. The final question remains: will
any Minnesota utilities actually implement a value of solar tariff
196
once a price is determined?
3.

Community Solar Gardens

The central argument against DG and net metering is the cycle
197
mentioned previously. The more people who begin to use DG
and net meter, the higher the rates will increase for those who do
198
not. Those who do not use DG are: (1) those who cannot afford
the hefty upfront costs associated with implementing a DG
199
system, (2) those who do not “own a home with a structurally

192. See, e.g., id.
193. See Will Craven, Why Solar Net Metering Beats a Value-of-Solar Tariff Every
Time, GRIST (May 12, 2014), http://grist.org/article/why-solar-net-metering-beats
-a-value-of-solar-tariff-every-time/; Amanda H. Miller, Could FITs Be a Bad Fit for the
U.S., RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.renewableenergy
world.com/rea/blog/post/2013/08/could-fits-be-a-bad-fit-for-the-u-s.
194. FARRELL, supra note 162, at 8–11.
195. See Farrell, supra note 16.
196. See Value of Solar Tariff Methodology, MINN. DEP’T COMMERCE, http://
mn.gov/commerce/energy/businesses/energy-leg-initiatives/value-of-solar-tariff
-methodology%20.jsp (last visited Feb. 22, 2015). Xcel Energy is the first utility to
create a methodology for calculating the value of solar and the first utility to have
their value of solar methodology approved by the PUC, but the tariffs adoption by
the utilities is voluntary. Dan Haugen, Minnesota Becomes First State to Set ‘Value of
Solar’ Tariff, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.midwestenergy
news.com/2014/03/12/minnesota-becomes-first-state-to-set-value-of-solar-tariff/.
197. See generally Holden, supra note 41.
198. See id.
199. Powers, supra note 58, at 639 (“For many people, the upfront costs of
renewable technology are prohibitively expensive.”).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss5/3

26

Shoop: The Rise of Renewables and Distributed Generation in Minnesota

2015]

RISE OF RENEWABLES IN MINNESOTA

1717

200

suitable roof,” or (3) those whose homes do not receive enough
201
The
sunlight or wind to make DG economically viable.
percentage of individuals who fall into one of these three
202
categories is estimated to be 75% of the population. The solution
to these issues may be in Minnesota’s new community solar garden
203
statute.
A community solar garden is defined by statute as “a facility
that generates electricity by means of a ground-mounted or roofmounted solar photovoltaic device whereby subscribers receive a
bill credit for the electricity generated in proportion to the size of
204
their subscription.” Put another way, a community solar garden is
“owned, developed, or controlled—in full or in part—by residents
205
of the community in which the project is located.” In practice,
the residents are purchasing a subscription to a percentage of the
energy produced by the community solar garden and selling that
206
percentage to the utility. The individual who purchases the
subscription to the energy will receive an energy credit at the
207
applicable retail rate, until a value of solar rate is adopted. Under
the current program, that same individual will receive a specified
amount per kilowatt-hour (kWh) from the utilities for the RECs
208
created through their percentage of the community solar garden.
Anyone located within, or contiguous to, a county that has a
community solar garden can offset their energy use with solar

200. Samantha Booth, Comment, Here Comes the Sun: How Securities Regulations
Cast a Shadow on the Growth of Community Solar in the United States, 61 UCLA L. REV.
760, 768 (2014) (“The most glaring deficiency of the residential model is that an
individual must own a home with a structurally suitable roof as a prerequisite to
solar ownership.”).
201. See id. at 768–69 (discussing siting issues with residential solar).
202. See id. at 774.
203. See generally MINN. STAT. § 216B.1641 (2014).
204. Id. § 216B.1641(b).
205. Deborah Behles, From Dirty to Green: Increasing Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy in Environmental Justice Communities, 58 VILL. L. REV. 25, 45 (2013).
206. See MINN. STAT. § 216B.1641(b).
207. Id. § 216B.1641(d).
208. Id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 10(i); Order Approving Solar-Garden Plan with
Modifications at 1, 5, Docket No. E-002/M-13-867 (Minn. P.U.C. Sept. 17, 2014);
John Farrell, Community Solar Gardens Sprouting in Minnesota, INST. FOR LOCAL SELFRELIANCE (Apr. 22, 2014), http://ilsr.org/community-solar-gardens-sprouting
-minnesota/ (discussing the REC compensation rates and how the REC rates are
not eligible if Made in Minnesota was used for a community solar garden project).
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209

energy through a subscription. The individual can also choose to
210
purchase only a limited amount of energy, up to 120% of their
current demand, making it a solar option that is far less cost
restrictive.
By statute, Xcel Energy was required to create a community
211
solar garden program. The plan Xcel created was subsequently
212
approved by the PUC on September 17, 2014. However, plans to
build community solar gardens had been in the works long before
213
then.
On December 12, 2014, Xcel opened the door for
community solar gardens, and within one week, Xcel received over
214
400 applications from solar developers. Unfortunately, Xcel was
the only utility required to present a community solar garden plan,
215
although a few cooperatives have started their own. Therefore, to
purchase energy from a community solar garden, the individual
must be within Xcel’s territory or the territories of the few other
utilities on board. By only requiring Xcel to offer community solar
gardens, the majority of the state is currently without the
community-garden option. A revision in which all public utilities,
or all utilities generally, are required to offer community solar
programs would give electricity customers across the state equal
opportunity access to community solar.
For now it is up to each individual utility to decide for itself if it
216
wants to introduce programs of its own. Choosing to do so could
have distinct benefits for the utilities. Under the statute, the utilities
217
are allowed to develop their own community gardens. If utilized,
209. MINN. STAT. § 216B.1641(c).
210. See id. § 216B.1641(b) (“Each subscription shall be sized to represent at
least 200 watts of the community solar garden’s generating capacity . . . .”).
211. Id. § 216B.1641(a).
212. Order Approving Solar-Garden Plan with Modifications, supra note 208.
213. See David Shaffer, First Solar Garden in Minneapolis Sold Out, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Feb. 18, 2014, at 07A, available at 2014 WLNR 4523394.
214. David Shaffer, Xcel Energy Gets 427 Solar Garden Applications, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Dec. 20, 2014, at 01D, available at 2014 WLNR 36305496.
215. Bryna Godar, Community Solar Spreads Across State, POSTBULLETIN.COM,
http://www.postbulletin.com/business/community-solar-spreads-across-state
/article_9ae6ab7e-ad35-55fb-bb58-e8417cdb0f91.html (last updated Nov. 5, 2014,
1:36 AM)
216. MINN. STAT. § 216B.1641(a) (“Other public utilities may file an application at their election.”).
217. Id. (“The owner of the community solar garden may be a public utility or
any other entity or organization that contracts to sell the output from the
community solar garden to the utility under section 216B.164.”).
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this simple fact has the potential to catalyze a transition for utilities
from being DG’s largest opponent to one of its supporters. By
allowing utilities to purchase and operate community solar
218
gardens, it enables them to enter the DG market on their own.
Utilities fear DG because it costs them customer sales, which in
turn lowers their bottom line and forces them to increase other
219
customers’ rates. If a utility becomes the owner of a community
solar garden, there is no loss of customer sales; the current
customers simply transition to the community solar system and
continue to pay the utility.
Another benefit for those utilities that choose to invest in their
own community solar garden is a reduction in transmission costs.
220
An inherent benefit of DG is lowered transmission costs. The
closer an individual is to the source of the energy, the less the cost
221
of transmitting the energy. For example, the cost of sending
energy from the Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant to homes
across Minnesota is going to cost more in transmission than
sending energy from a community solar garden within
Bloomington, Minnesota to other homes in Bloomington,
222
Minnesota. Utilities would receive the benefit of lowering their
transmission costs without losing customer sales, conceivably
increasing their bottom line.
The community solar garden statute does not restrict the
aggregate total number of gardens, distinct from the 4% cap that
223
limits the application of the net metering. Because of this, the
number of community solar gardens allowed within the state is

218. Jeff St. John, Survey: Utilities See Threat, Opportunity in Distributed Generation,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles
/read/Utilities-See-Threat-Opportunity-in-Distributed-Generation.
219. David Roberts, Solar Panels Could Destroy U.S. Utilities, According to U.S.
Utilities, GRIST (Apr. 10, 2013), http://grist.org/climate-energy/solar-panels-could
-destroy-u-s-utilities-according-to-u-s-utilities/ (“As ratepayers opt for solar panels
(and other distributed energy resources like micro-turbines, batteries, smart
appliances, etc.), it raises costs on other ratepayers and hurts the utility’s credit
rating.”).
220. Warren, supra note 2, at 363 (“Distributed generation can be less
expensive because few or no transmission lines need to be built to distribute the
electricity, and as technology has improved manufacturing costs have
decreased.”).
221. See id.
222. See generally id.
223. Compare MINN. STAT. § 216B.1641 (2014), with id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 4b.
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unlimited. On the other hand, the community solar garden statute
restricts systems’ sizes to the same 1000 kWh (1MW) capacity limit
224
to which net metering is held. It also restricts the allotment of
ownership to 40% of the total shares for a single customer and
225
requires at least five subscribers per garden. These provisions
were created with the intention of keeping large customers from
crowding out opportunities for smaller, more residential
226
ownership.
Having a 40% ownership cap may seem limiting; however, the
PUC revised the definition of community solar garden sites, stating
that multiple sites “situated in close proximity to one another can
227
share distribution infrastructure.” The PUC also states that a
228
customer can subscribe to multiple community solar gardens.
This allows solar customers to subscribe to multiple solar gardens
that may be located in close proximity to each other to achieve
229
greater solar production.
For this policy to be effective, there needs to be more than one
community solar garden in a semi-local area to which customers
can subscribe. Because the development of community solar
gardens is in its early stages, only a limited number of community
230
solar gardens exist across the state. It is also unknown how long it
will be before enough solar gardens become available for a
customer to subscribe to more than one garden, or if community
solar gardens will even be available to every Xcel customer.
One solution may be to increase the 1000 kWh limit to allow
for a greater amount of kWh for the percentage purchased per
customer. This increase would also benefit utilities that
manufacture and maintain their own community solar gardens by
allowing them to build larger facilities.

224. MINN. STAT. § 216B.1641(b).
225. Id. § 216B.1641(a).
226. See Order Approving Solar-Garden Plan with Modifications, supra note
208, at 10–11.
227. Id. at 15.
228. Id. at 11.
229. Id.
230. David Boyd, Minnesota Solar Gardens: Progress Report, ENERGYBIZ, Sept.–
Oct. 2014, at 41, 41, available at http://energycentral.fileburstcdn.com/EnergyBiz
Magazine/2014/SeptOct14.pdf.
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Made in Minnesota

As the name implies, the Made in Minnesota (MiM) solar
231
232
incentive program is for PV solar and solar thermal systems that
233
are manufactured here in Minnesota. MiM is a lottery-based
234
where applicants hope to be awarded one of two
system
235
incentives. The solar thermal project incentive is a direct 25%
236
rebate on the installed project costs.
For PV projects, the
production incentive is a dollar amount equivalent to the amount
per kWh produced. The per kWh incentive rate is set based on a
variety of factors, including the qualifying solar panel’s size, panel
237
manufacturer, and the type of owner who qualifies. In addition,
because the incentive is paid for by the utilities, the incentive
238
program creates RECs that are transferred directly to the utilities.
239
The programs have been shown to be effective, but there is
room for improvement. The 25% solar-thermal rebate program is
limited, depending on the type of producer: $2500 for residential,
240
$5000 for multiple family, and $25,000 for industrial projects.
The solar PV production incentive is only allowed for systems
241
under forty kilowatts,
even though many commercial and
industrial customers can utilize systems up to twenty-five times
242
Further, the PV
greater under the net metering statute.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

MINN. STAT. § 216C.413, subdiv. 1(1).
Id. § 216C.416, subdiv. 1.
Id. § 216C.411(a)(1).
Id. § 216C.415, subdiv. 2.
See id. § 216C.416, subdiv. 3.
Id.
Made in Minnesota Solar Energy Production Incentive, DATABASE ST.
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system
/program/detail/5418 (last updated Jan. 7, 2015).
238. Id.
239. Elizabeth Dunbar, Strong Solar Power Demand Outstripping Minnesota
Subsidy Program, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.mprnews.org
/story/2014/03/07/solar-power-demand-minnesota.
240. MINN. STAT. § 216C.416, subdiv. 3. (“The maximum rebate for a single
family residential dwelling installation is the lesser of 25 percent of the installed
cost of a complete system or $2,500. The maximum rebate for a multiple family
residential dwelling installation is the lesser of 25 percent of the installed cost of a
complete system or $5,000. The maximum rebate for a commercial installation is
the lesser of 25 percent of the installation cost of the complete system or
$25,000.”).
241. Id. § 216C.415, subdiv. 1.
242. See id. § 216B.164, subdiv. 3a.
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243

production incentive is capped at $15 million a year. Both the
solar thermal rebate and the solar PV production incentive are only
available to public utility customers, again leaving out the
substantial portion of Minnesota’s electric customers served by
244
municipals and cooperatives.
The solar PV production incentive in particular has been
245
demonstrated to be in high demand. In 2013, 282 residents
246
applied for the program, and 251 (89%) were funded. For
247
commercial applicants, only 39% were funded.
In total, 12
megawatts were applied for, and if all applicants had been funded,
it “would have doubled the amount of solar capacity in the state in
248
2013 in one year.” This illustrates the overwhelming demand for
the MiM program, and the barriers presented by its limited
funding.
Increasing these incentives would not be financially difficult.
The MiM incentives are paid from funds provided by utility
249
companies’ spending on energy conservation improvements. By
statute, each public utility is required to use “1.5[%] of its gross
operating revenues from service provided in the state,” and 2% for
Xcel, to “spend and invest for energy conservation
250
improvements.” The utilities are required to place 5% of these
251
funds into the MiM account to be used for the incentives. The
MiM incentives account for, at most, 0.1% of a utility’s gross
operating revenue. Doubling MiM annual expenditures to $30
million would help to meet the established demand, at a cost of just
0.2% of the gross operating revenue.
Including municipals and cooperatives would be manageable
because they already have their own conservation improvement
252
funds. The municipal and cooperative conservation improvement

243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. § 216C.412, subdiv. 2(b).
See id. § 216C.412, subdiv. 2.
Dunbar, supra note 239.
Frank Jossi, Businesses Flock to ‘Made in Minnesota’ Solar Program, MIDWEST
ENERGY NEWS (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2014/10/10
/businesses-flock-to-made-in-minnesota-solar-program/.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. MINN. STAT. § 216C.412.
250. Id. § 216B.241, subdiv. 1a.
251. Id. § 216C.412, subdiv. 2.
252. See id. § 216B.241, subdiv. 1b.
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253

funds mirror the public utility’s funds at 1.5%. Earmarking 5% or
10% of that fund for MiM would open up 42% of the electric
254
customers in the state to increased incentives for solar energy.
Due to the fact that the MiM incentive is capitalized from an
existing program fund, with specific caps on the overall
expenditure, expanding the percentage allocated to MiM would
not affect the bottom lines of either the public utilities or the
municipals and cooperatives. While an increase in the percentage
allotted to MiM necessarily decreases investments in other
programs, the MiM incentive program has two distinct advantages.
First, MiM is beneficial to the utilities, allowing for the creation of
additional RECs that are diverted directly to the utilities. Second, it
is in high demand with the solar producers, who reap the direct
benefits. Alternatively, policymakers wishing to avoid diverting
money from other programs could push for an overall increase in
the percentage allotted to the conservation improvement funds of
public utilities, cooperatives, and municipals.
V. ADJUSTING THE BUSINESS MODEL
A central argument made by utilities against DG and
increasing net metering and community solar limits is the same
argument pointed to throughout this Note: as more individuals use
DG, rates will rise faster for others who are still solely dependent on
255
256
the utilities. The rise of DG is essentially a foregone conclusion,
but the increase in rates is not. Utilities can remain cost effective
without increasing the rates of those who have not transitioned to
257
DG, through various means. Two of the main recommendations
253. Id. (requiring municipalities to spend 1.5% of gross revenues from the
sale of electricity and cooperatives to spend 1.5% of gross operating revenues from
all service in the state on energy improvements).
254. Meet Minnesota’s Municipal Utilities, supra note 143; see supra note 147 and
accompanying text.
255. Holden, supra note 41.
256. Experts Weigh Impact of Distributed Generation on Utility Business Model, supra
note 13 (“Jeff Navin: It’s not a question as to whether or not there’s going to be
distributed generation. The question is how can regulators and utilities work to
come up with a business model that allows the utilities to earn revenue and make a
profit to remain viable and stable . . . .”).
257. See Berthold Hannes & Matt Abbot, Distributed Energy: Disrupting the
Utility Business Model, BAIN & COMPANY (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.bain
.com/publications/articles/distributed-energy-disrupting-the-utility-business
-model.aspx.
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258

are (1) for the utilities to enter the DG market or (2) for the PUC
259
and the utilities to change the existing business model.
A.

Entering the Distributed Generation Market
260

Utilities can enter the DG market in two ways. First, utilities
can start manufacturing DG systems, including rooftop solar PV,
and sell or lease them to homeowners, either directly themselves or
261
through partners.
Currently, the majority of the residential
rooftop solar industry is occupied by third-party installers with no
262
direct benefit to utilities. “However, [entering this market] is a
natural fit for utilities, as they are already selling electricity to
263
customers.” Their experience gives them “proprietary system
knowledge . . . brand recognition and an existing relationship with
264
their customers.” Utilities in Minnesota would not be alone if
they began investing in DG, as utilities in several states, such as
California, Virginia, and Arizona, are already investigating the
265
opportunity or have already invested.

258. Id.
259. Experts Weigh Impact of Distributed Generation on Utility Business Model, supra
note 13 (“Jon Wellinghoff: . . . . Utilities, I think, are going to have to change and
have to evolve, and evolve in ways that they can restructure their business models
to be accommodating to and consistent with this new distributed world.”); Policy
Framework to Optimize Efficiency of the Electrical Energy System, supra note 37, at 17.
260. Exploring Models for Regulated Utilities to Enter the Residential Solar Distributed
Generation Market, COLUMBIA SCH. INT’L & PUB. AFF., https://sipa.columbia.edu
/academics/capstone-workshops/exploring-models-for-regulated-utilities-to-enter
-the-residential-solar-distributed-generation (last visited May 1, 2015).
261. See id.
262. Omar Arriaga et al., Utilities Can Win by Entering the Distributed Solar Market,
EDGE NOTES (Mar. 5, 2014) https://centers.fuqua.duke.edu/edgenotes/2014/03
/05/utilities-can-win-by-entering-the-distributed-solar-market/.
263. Id.
264. Coley Girouard & Frank Swigonski, STATE: Arizona Regulators Ponder
Utility-Owned Rooftop Solar While Competitors Object to Monopoly Advantages,
ADVANCED ENERGY ECON. (Nov. 20, 2014 3:21 PM), http://blog.aee.net/state
-arizona-regulators-ponder-utility-owned-rooftop-solar-while-competitors-object-to
-monopoly-advantages.
265. Nichola Groom, Big Utilities Pushing into Booming Home Solar Market,
REUTERS, Oct. 22, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/22
/us-utilities-solar-idUSKCN0IB16I20141022; Arriaga et al., supra note 262; David
Savenije & Ethan Howland, Are Utilities Missing the Rooftop Solar Opportunity?,
UTILITY DIVE (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/are-utilities-missing
-the-rooftop-solar-opportunity/208441/.
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Moving into the DG industry is not without its risks. Recently, a
controversy arose over two utilities in Arizona that submitted
proposals to the Arizona Corporation Commission, Arizona’s
equivalent to Minnesota’s PUC, that would allow them access to the
266
residential solar market.
The third-party solar companies
opposed the proposal, stating that the utilities participation “is an
267
inappropriate activity for a state-sponsored, regulated monopoly.”
The Arizona Corporation Commission has not ruled on the
268
proposal yet, but their decision will likely be debated in other
269
states across the country in the near future. As Minnesota’s solar
industry grows and third-party companies become stronger, these
companies are likely to resist utilities’ encroachment on their
270
market position, as evidenced in Arizona.
The second option for DG market entry is for utilities to
construct and operate their own community solar gardens, which is
271
currently allowed by statute. Utilities can capture the benefits of
272
273
reducing transmission costs, avoiding the loss of customer sales
274
and the need to increase rates. As seen in Arizona and elsewhere,
some individuals in the solar industry do not like the idea of the
275
utilities entering their market, but if the end goal is to decrease
carbon emissions, then this option deserves strong consideration.
B.

Changing the Traditional Business Model

The PUC and the utilities can change the long-standing
276
traditional business model to avoid increasing rates for those not
266. Girouard & Swigonski, supra note 264.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See id. (noting that, as in Arizona, third-party companies in Minnesota are
unlikely to accept the utilities encroachment on what the third-parties feel is their
territory, the DG market).
271. MINN. STAT. § 216B.1641(a) (2014).
272. Warren, supra note 2, at 363 (“Distributed generation can be less
expensive because few or no transmission lines need to be built to distribute the
electricity, and as technology has improved manufacturing costs have
decreased.”).
273. Holden, supra note 41.
274. Id.
275. Arriaga et al., supra note 262; Girouard & Swigonski, supra note 264.
276. KIND, supra note 1, at 18 (“Identify new business models and services that
can be provided by electric utilities in all states to customers in order to recover
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277

using DG and avert the ensuing spiral that is predicted to occur.
As mentioned above, utilities generate revenue under the
traditional business model through two means: (1) owning more
278
capital assets, and (2) selling more energy. DG directly impedes
this process by reducing the amount of energy sold, reducing the
need to build future assets, and thus reducing the revenue a utility
279
earns. Some analogize DG’s threat to electric utilities to the effect
that cell phones had on the telecommunications industry; this
disruption is a central reason for recommending a new business
280
model for utilities.
One of the most highly-recommended new models for
Minnesota is a performance-based regulatory framework in which
utilities are rewarded for “efficient delivery of reliable, affordable
281
and clean electricity.”
A performance-based framework for
regulation sets a price cap or revenue cap for the rates that a utility
282
can charge. The cap is based on a complex formula that includes
different performance standard metrics, which serve as incentives
that can increase or decrease the cap based on performance
283
instead of sales.
The performance standard metrics
recommended include, among others, “overall system efficiency;
consistent control of rates and costs to consumers; total
environmental impact of a utility; customer-level reliability and
quality of service; individual customer-level efficiency and reduced
284
overall demand, and more.” The performance-based framework

lost margin while providing a valuable customer service . . . .”).
277. See Holden, supra note 41.
278. Policy Framework to Optimize Efficiency of the Electrical Energy System, supra
note 37, at 16.
279. See Levine, supra note 38; Policy Framework to Optimize Efficiency of the
Electrical Energy System, supra note 37, at 15.
280. KIND, supra note 1, at 14; Warren, supra note 2, at 357–58.
281. Policy Framework to Optimize Efficiency of the Electrical Energy System, supra
note 37, at 17; see also Ron Davis, Acting on Performance-Based Regulation, ELECTRICITY
J., May 2000, at 13, 15, available at http://regulationbodyofknowledge.org
/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Davis_Acting_on_Performance.pdf; Herman K.
Trabish, Can Performance-Based Ratemaking Save Utilities?, UTILITY DIVE (Apr. 17,
2014), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/can-performance-based-ratemaking-save
-utilities/252683/.
282. Davis, supra note 281, at 15.
283. Id.
284. Policy Framework to Optimize Efficiency of the Electrical Energy System, supra
note 37, at 16.
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thus allows, and even motivates, utilities to find more efficient
285
means of delivering energy, including renewables and DG.
Instituting a performance-based regulatory framework in
Minnesota would require the PUC and the utilities to make a
number of changes, including adjusting utilities’ regulatory
framework, removing the incentives for increasing capital assets
and kilowatt hours sold, and replacing these incentives with the set
of performance standard metrics stated above. The utilities would
need to adjust their business model to facilitate meeting the new
metrics. Introducing these changes would certainly entail a large
amount of work and would be a daunting task for both the PUC
and the utilities; however, the transition to a new model may not be
as difficult as it appears.
The task of transitioning to a new business model is less
daunting when taking into consideration that “[m]ost—if not all—
of the metrics required to achieve a holistic performance based
regulatory model in Minnesota are currently in use today by
286
utilities or regulators.” Currently, the metrics are only used “as
requirements for utilities to continue operating[,] . . . to achieve
simple cost recovery of investments,” or “to judge the performance
287
of a [public utility].” They are not used “to provide a rate of
288
However,
return or similar financial reward” to the utilities.
calculating a rate of return from existing, repurposed metrics is far
simpler than creating and implementing a whole new metric system
for a complex industry from scratch.
VI. CONCLUSION
DG is poised to become one of the most influential new
technologies of this century. It has the potential to substantially
help reduce carbon emissions by introducing greater amounts of
renewables and it allows people to have control over their own
energy. Policies currently in place should be reexamined and
improved to meet the growing demand for DG in Minnesota.
Utilities should also take advantage of the opportunities presented
to them for DG instead of attempting to fight the oncoming wave.

285.
286.
287.
288.

See id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
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